Why Despite Threats, Turkey Won’t Impose Sanctions On Kurdistan After The Referendum

Submitted by Elijah Magnier, Middle East based chief international war correspondent for Al Rai Media

High-ranking sources in Kurdistan (Erbil) said that the Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani “expected the sanctions already announced by Baghdad and expects many more sanctions to come in the future”. Nevertheless, “the referendum was an essential step to undertake,” otherwise Barzani would no longer be considered the Kurdish leader.

“We are not afraid of Turkish sanctions because Ankara would lose more than it will gain if the common borders are closed. The Turkish representative promised us (months before the referendum) that harsh political measures will be adopted against Kurdistan but that no economic sanctions would be seriously considered. After all it is up to Turkey to stop sending its oil tankers to recover our oil production at a cheap price if Erdogan considers it a practical move within his own economy,” said the source.

Good morning! We see no disruptions in KRG crude oil exports out of the Turkish port of Ceyhan as today there are two tankers loading. #OOTT pic.twitter.com/BzTj1eGf0W

— TankerTrackers.com???? (@TankerTrackers) September 29, 2017

In past 5 days. 553K barrels of KRG oil departed daily from the Turkish port of Ceyhan for Croatia, Italy & Israel. Normal activity. #OOTT pic.twitter.com/lidVIK6DSg

— TankerTrackers.com???? (@TankerTrackers) September 29, 2017

The Erbil leadership knows that the Kurds lived through hunger and genocide throughout the years, sometimes living in the mountains for decades. Therefore, although any threat to their existence won’t be taken lightly, it cannot affect the process of independence that has been put on their desired track. The Kurdish leaders will agree to allow Baghdad to control airports (Erbil and Suleymaniyeh) as requested by Prime Minister Haidar Abadi, and would like to reestablish good neighbor relationships with all surrounding countries, particularly since the declaration of independence may require two or three years to put into concrete effect.

The 1800 km long borders between Kurdistan and the rest of Iraq will force Erbil to send more Peshmerga troops to reinforce its security all along its borders and especially in disputed areas. However, for many countries the referendum has created embarrassment and reshuffled many of the alliances in the Middle East: the implications of this have yet to be considered. It is Turkey that will be holding the key to the success or failure of a new “state” in the Middle East: Iraqi Kurdistan.

A pipeline network connects Iraq’s northern oil fields to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. Photo: Anadolu News Agency.

A pipeline network connects Iraq’s northern oil fields to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. Image source: Anadolu News Agency.

Turkey, a summary of its role in the recent history of Syria and Iraq:

  • Turkey supported the uprising of Sunni tribes in 2014 when these metamorphosed into the “Islamic State” (ISIS) terror group. Ankara didn’t ask its consulate diplomat to abandon the diplomatic mission, and so the diplomatic staff became prisoners in ISIS’ hands, to be later exchanged with hundreds of mujahideen and their families held by Turkey.
  • Ankara allowed the Iraqi Peshmerga to cross its territory into Syria to help the YPG (the Syrian branch of Turkey’s most sworn enemy: the PKK) and recover Ain al-Arab (Kobane) from ISIS in the north of Syria.
  • Turkey opened its borders to Jihadists from al-Qaeda and ISIS under the excuse of “bringing down the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad”.
  • Turkey brought down a Russian jet while bombing jihadists along the Syrian borders, pushing Moscow to heavily engage in the Syrian war and give the upper hand to Assad.
  • Turkey allowed al-Qaeda and the foreign fighters of the Turkistani group to occupy the bordering city of Kessab. The city was later recovered but Ankara created another military balance by expulsing from its territory of thousands of members of al-Qaeda who then occupied the city of Idlib, today the center of al-Qaeda in Syria (also known as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham).
  • Turkey asked its Syrian proxy to pull out of the city of Aleppo, rendering its liberation easier and less costly for the Syrian Army and its allies, which marked a real turning point in the war in Syria.
  • Turkey joined the de-confliction negotiation in Astana (Kazakhstan) after reconciliation with Moscow and the return to normal relations between both countries.
  • Turkey moved its forces into Syria to stop the creation of a Kurdish “state” known as “Rojava” (from al-Hasaka to Efrin) and disrupted a Kurdish Syrian access to the Mediterranean that could have been also used in the future for the Iraqi Kurds in case of sanctions against Iraqi Kurdistan.
  • Turkey considered Iran a “terrorist state sponsor” but kept its diplomatic relationship with Tehran. It increased economic exchanges and fully collaborated with Iran in Astana as partners and guarantors in Syria.
  • Ankara did not hesitate to support the Iraqi Kurds in order to enjoy economic advantages, and to keep its forces in the north of Iraq. Despite many attempts by Baghdad to remove the Turkish troops, Ankara rejected all demands and hid behind “the Kurdistan request” so as to maintain several hundreds of officers and soldiers in Iraq.
  • Turkey is not expected to implement any economic sanctions against Erbil despite Erdogan screaming, “the Kurds will go hungry”. There is no doubt, however, that Turkish officials will continue launching verbal attacks against Barzani but doubt remains about economic sanctions and the cessation of oil purchases.

To sum it up: President Erdogan declared war on the Syrian Kurds but prevented them from losing Kobane; declared war on Assad but supported him to recover Aleppo; declared war on terrorism but allowed ISIS and al-Qaeda to enjoy all support from Turkey and bought oil from ISIS; threatened the Iraqi Kurds but still bought their oil while keeping its hundreds of trucks queuing up on their borders; promised to keep al-Qaeda under control in Idlib during the last Astana meeting, but allowed it to launch military offensives afterwards.

It is obvious that the Iraqi Kurds are aware of Ankara’s unstable and continuously changing of policy, very confident that any other measures by surrounding countries (Iraq and Iran) can be easily overcome in the future, as long as Erdogan is offering alternatives. The cost is that the Iraqi Kurds fall into Ankara’s hands and control, but it looks like Barzani is happy with this outcome: as long as he has his new state, pushing its place onto the Middle East map, right in the middle.

Iran and Iraq

The Kurdish referendum pushed Iraq into the arms of Iran when the relationship between Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar Abadi and Iranian officials was at its lowest level. Today Abadi (and most Iraqis) sees in Iran the only sincere partner to count on, and can rely on the Iranian Army and Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in the case of any military escalation against Kurdistan, particularly in the disputed Iraqi cities, with Kirkuk at the top of the list.

Baghdad is confident that Barzani didn’t take this step without a blessing from the Americans, which is expected to become more visible in the coming months, according to Iraqi officials in Baghdad. It seems Washington decided to swap its relationship with Baghdad with that of Erbil because, apparently, it won’t be able to support both at the same time.

Supporting Erbil is more attractive to the US and its regional allies (particularly Saudi Arabia), in the hope that the Kurdish Iraqi move would trigger the appetite of the Kurdish Iranians (and the Syrian Kurds who are already on this same path). If this happens and we observe an uprising in Iran (the Saudis already promised to support any unrest in Iran), the Iranian economy and that of the government of Baghdad will be both under severe pressure.

Iran supported Barzani in 2014 and provided him with weapons (at a time when the US was denying any support to Iraq, during the 6 months after the fall of Mosul in 2014), but it is today in an undeclared war against Erbil, fully behind Baghdad’s measures and supporting future escalation and punitive steps.

No one can wind back the clock to before the Kurdish referendum. However, it is still possible for Barzani to avoid contributing toward a further mess in this increasingly reshuffled Middle East. He could indeed consider all these issues as an unnecessary concern, similar to a “storm in a tea cup”. Unfortunately, it seems the Kurdish leader is determined to continue his path, denying any immediate intent for concrete realization of independence, yet without excluding it.

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Для Любителей Narcos и Gomora

Сериал Эль Чапо    El Chapo.
ГлавТрейдер- 
ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%93%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BC%D0%B0%D0%BD_%D0%9B%D0%BE%D1%8D%D1%80%D0%B0,_%D0%A5%D0%BE%D0%B0%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%BD

Хоакин Арчивальдо Гусман Лоэра, известен как «El Chapo» («Эль Чапо» — Коротышка) (исп. Joaquín Archivaldo Guzmán Loera; род. 25 декабря1954 или 4 апреля 1957[1]Ла ТунаБадирагуатоСиналоаМексика) — мексиканский наркобарон, глава наркокартеля Синалоа, участник клана Ангар.

С 2009 по 2011 год Гусман занимал 41-е, 55-е и 60-е места соответственно в списке самых могущественных людей в мире по версии журнала «Forbes», тем самым являясь вторым по влиятельности человеком в Мексике после Карлоса Слима[2][3].

Запись Для Любителей Narcos и Gomora впервые появилась Прогноз курса валют. Форекс новости.

CHILE: Industrial Output Posts 5.1% Annual Rise In August Boosted By Miners

Chile’s industrial output recorded a 5.1% rise in August on an annual basis, accelerating its growth momentum boosted by the mining sector activity, said the country’s statistics office.

In August, Chile’s industrial activity rose primarily due to th…

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Тренды российской экономики

Тут вся макроэкономика по России собрана.
www.forecast.ru/_ARCHIVE/SocMon/2017/Mon082017.pdf
Чтобы на Росстате долго не искать. Картинки кликабельны, увеличиваются по клику.
Тренды российской экономики
Тренды российской экономики
Тренды российской экономики
Тренды российской экономики
Тренды российской экономики
Тренды российской экономики
Тренды российской экономики
Тренды российской экономики
Тренды российской экономики
Тренды российской экономики
Тренды российской экономики
Тренды российской экономики
Тренды российской экономики
Тренды российской экономики
Тренды российской экономики
Тренды российской экономики
То же самое в виде таблиц.

Тренды российской экономики
Тренды российской экономики
Тренды российской экономики
Тренды российской экономики

Запись Тренды российской экономики впервые появилась Прогноз курса валют. Форекс новости.

Профильный ЕГЭ по Математике

Всем Здравствуйте

Вроде Выходные, немного оффтопа… Тем более Наш тов.Твардовский уверен, что Математика Трейдерам нужна:)

Сегодня наш уважаемый Коллега VadimTrade написал про ужОс Российского образования. Т.к. я уже раз 100 видел подобные заголовки, предлагаю всем ужОсающимся решить за, кажется, 3 Час 45 Минут Профильный Вариант. При всех решенных Задачах-ящичек недорогого пива.

4ege.ru/trening-matematika/52762-zadaniya-profilnogo-urovnya-s-ege-po-matematike-6-iyunya.html

Ну просто чтобы понимать о чем ужОсаемся.

Всем УДАЧИ

P.S. а как вставить pdf файл?

Запись Профильный ЕГЭ по Математике впервые появилась Прогноз курса валют. Форекс новости.

Bitcoin may be Considered Virtual Property Under new Chinese Regulation

It looks as if we may finally see official cryptocurrency regulation in China. Although this discussion has gone on for some time, the conclusion may arrive in a day from now.Chinese sources claim the new guidelines will go into effect on October 1st of 2017. Although no one knows for sure what the regulation entails, … Continue reading Bitcoin may be Considered Virtual Property Under new Chinese Regulation

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Why Madrid Will Never Let Go – Catalonia Is Closer To The Eurozone Than Spain

As we have detailed previously, the Spanish region of Catalonia in the North-Eastern corner of Spain will attempt to hold an independence referendum tomorrow, against the will of the central government in Madrid.

Apart from the Baleares and the Madrid region itself, Catalonia together with its capital Barcelona is one of the most economically-powerful parts of the country.

Notably, as Statista’s infographic below shows that the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of Catalonia lies closer to that of the Eurozone than of Spain as a whole.

Infographic: Catalonia Closer to the Eurozone Than to Spain | Statista

You will find more statistics at Statista

This in mind, it comes as no surprise that Madrid is by all means opposed to letting go of Catalonia.

As The BBC notes, Catalonia, a wealthy region of 7.5 million people in north-eastern Spain, has its own language and culture. It also has a high degree of autonomy, but is not recognised as a separate nation under the Spanish constitution. Pressure for a vote on self-determination has grown over the past five years as austerity has hit the Spanish economy and people hard.

Why is Madrid so opposed?

Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy stared down Catalan secessionists when they held a trial referendum in 2014, offering no concessions to their demand for a legal vote.

He has pledged to stop the 2017 vote, saying it goes against the constitution which refers to “the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards”.

 

Which brings to mind the biggest question, what would happen to Spain in case of Catalonia’s secession?

As GEFIRA explains, in terms of the debt sustainability parameters laid down by the Treaty of Maastricht, it’d be the Eurozone debt crisis 2.0.

As Spain now maintains the second year of 3% GDP growth, an even bigger, immediate fiscal threat is looming. After multiple ineffective referendums in the previous years, this time the Catalan government is likely to finally assert independence. What will it look like against the background of the Maastricht financial requirements?

Debt to GDP ratio

The Treaty of Maastricht says it should be 60%. Spain’s debt to GDP ratio was 39% in 2007, but after the financial crisis it gradually rose to 99.4% today. Should Catalonia leave, there are two possible scenarios:

1. Catalonia agrees to take a share of the Spanish total debt, as a “divorce bill”, because after all it benefited from the government spending in Catalonia itself;

 

or

 

2. Catalonia leaves without taking any share of the total Spanish debt.

In the first case, nothing would change, assuming Catalonia would agree to take the share of Spanish debt equal to its share in Spain’s total GDP. In that case, Catalonia accounts roughly for 20% of the Spanish GDP, which means it would take 20% of the Spanish debt. Given that the Spanish debt is right now almost the same size as the Spanish GDP, calculations are rather simple.

Source: Statista.

The second option is rather dramatic. Without Catalonia, Spanish GDP would automatically shrink by 20%, while having to service the entirety of the debt. The debt to GDP percentage ratio would go from 99.4% to 124% overnight.

Deficit to GDP percentage ratio

The Treaty of Maastricht says it should be 3%. Spain has been way outside it since the financial crisis, with a peak at 11% in 2011. For 2016 it was 4.5%.

Here the problem is understanding how much more tax revenue Spain gets from Catalonia than it gives. Catalonia says 11.1€ billion, Spain says 8.5€.

Either way, as the deficit is calculated as expenditure minus revenue, it would be a hole in the revenue of the Spanish government of 8.5 to 11.1€ billion. Last year the deficit/GDP ratio was 4.5%, corresponding to approximately 21€ billion. With the Catalan secession, assuming a 10€ billion hole for simplicity between the estimates of the Spanish and Catalan governments, Spain’s deficit would go up to 60€ billion, while its GDP would shrink by 20%. Result? The deficit to GDP percentage ratio would be 6.7%, back to 2013.

Conclusion

The doomsday scenario would be Spain waking up with a debt equal to 124% of its GDP and growing, due to the 6.7% deficit, which would take another 4-5 years to be contained. The EU’s response to the possibility of Spanish bankruptcy would be predictable: more austerity. It is important to note that while Spain has been growing for the past two years and unemployment is also decreasing, the recipe chosen by the Spanish government, flexibility of the labour market in the form of temporary jobs, has exacerbated income inequality: as the OECD points out that temporary jobs are low-productivity and thus earn low wages; the precariousness of the job prevents improvements in productivity, thus improvement in wages. The poor remains poor, while the rich gets richer and the gap widens.4)

Boosting GDP and employment statistics with mini-jobs is thus masquerading an issue common to other Western countries: the collapse of the middle class.

Catalan independence could prove to be the last nail in the coffin: either Spain goes bankrupt or is forced to implement even more austerity at the risk of facing a revolution from the economically displaced.

*  *  *

And that’s why Madrid doesn’t want to lose Catalonia…

Once before, in October 1934, shortly before the Spanish Civil War (1936 to 1939) broke out, Catalonia had announced its independence from the rest of Spain. This prompted Madrid to sent the army to Barcelona.

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